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LEGISLATION

CRIMINAL LAW: VAGUENESS VERSUS COMMON LAW
CRIMINAL LIBEL
Ashton v. Kentucky, 86 Sup. Ct. 1407 (1966)
Petitioner, in response to a plea for help by unemployed miners,
left school in Ohio to go to Hazard, Kentucky, which was the scene
of a bitter labor dispute between union and nonunion miners. Attempting to aid in settling the dispute, he published a pamphlet
entitled Notes on a Mountain Strike. The pamphlet had only
limited circulation but contained statements that allegedly libeled
the local chief of police, sheriff, and co-owner of the newspaper. Petitioner was indicted for the common-law crime of libel for publishing the allegedly false and malicious document. He was found
guilty and sentenced to six months in jail and a 3,000 dollar fine.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed the trial court conviction., On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, HELD,
common law criminal libel violates due process because the elements
of the crime are too vague and indefinite. Judgment reversed.
Prior to the instant case, libel was punishable as a crime in all
fifty states.2 The crime at common law was based on the belief that
persons who felt themselves injured by a defamation might become
incited and seek revenge against the author. Because this revenge
might constitute a breach of the peace, the libeler was punished as
the source of the offense.3
Criminal libel jurisdictions can be separated into two groups.
First, many states have enacted statutes that eliminate the "incitement
to breach the peace" element. 4 Second, many states utilize the common law as the basis of a prosecution for libel and include the
"breach of the peace" element. Within this latter group, several
states have enacted statutes that make libel a crime without further
defining its elements. 5 Other states merely punish the offense as at
6
common law without legislative enactment.
1. Ashton v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 562 (Ky. 1966).
2. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255 (1952).
3. Note, Constitutionality of the Law of Criminal Libel, 52 COLUM. L. R. 521,
522 (1952).
DOUGLAs, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 42 (1958).
5. ALA. CODE, tit. 14, §347 (1958); D. C. CODE ANN. §22-2301 (1961); FLA. STAT.
§836.01 (1965); Miss. CODE ANN. §2268 (1942); NEB. REv. STAT. §28-440 (1943);
4.

N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-47 (1943); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2739.99 (Page 1954);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §942.01 (1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §6-117 (1957).

6. State v. Roberts, Del. (2 Man,.) 450, 43 AtI. 252 (1896); Robinson v. State,
108 Md. 644, 71 Atl. 433 (1908); Commonwealth v. Canter, 269 Mass. 359, 168 N.E.
790 (1929); State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34 (1837); State v. Spear, 13 R.I. 324 (1881);
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The Supreme Court in the principal case condemned the vagueness inherent in the definition of the crime of libel in Kentucky. The
Court focused on the portion of the definition contained in the trial
judge's instructions: "calculated to create disturbances of the peace,
corrupt the public morals, or lead to any act, which when done, is
indictable." 7 The Court had previously held that the crime of
breach of the peace was too vague to withstand the due process test.
Therefore, the decision was consistent with the Court's prior holdings
involving convictions for the crime of breach of the peace, 8 and
convictions for utterances which themselves constitute the crime of
breach of the peace.9
Prior to the present decision there had been six state appellate
decisions in Kentucky confirming the existence of the crime of libel.10
Three of these decisions contained the common law "breach of the
peace" element, which was also contained in the trial judge's jury
charge." The instant case seemed to turn on the inclusion of "breach
of the peace" as an element of the crime. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals had excluded "breach of the peace" from the definition of
the crime in affirming the trial court. The Supreme Court, however,
refused to accept the court of appeals' limitation of the trial court's
definition. The Court based this rationale on the principle of an
earlier case, Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,12 which disallowed
the upholding of a conviction by eliminating on appeal the unconstitutional aspects that were used at the trial. Reliance on this
principle indicates that the Court might accept a definition of common law criminal libel which does not contain the "breach of the
peace" element.13 The opinion, therefore, does not completely eliminate the crime of libel, but does eliminate "calculated to cause a
breach of the peace" as an element of the crime.
The principal case has similar impact on the Florida law of
criminal libel. The Florida Statutes punish criminal libel but conState v. Sutton, 74 Vt. 12, 52 At. 116 (1901); State v. Payne, 87 W. Va. 102, 104
S.E. 288 (1920).
7. Ashton v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 562 (Ky. 1966).
8. E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
9. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
10. Browning v. Commonwealth, 116 Ky. 282, 76 S.W. 19 (1963); Cole v. Commonwealth, 222 Ky. 350, 300 S.W. 907 (1927); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 127 Ky.
47, 104 S.W. 997 (1907); Provident Say. Life Assur. Soc'y v. Johnson, 115 Ky. 84,
72 S.W. 754 (1905); Smith v. Commonwealth, 98 Ky. 437, 33 S.W. 419 (1895); Tracy
v. Commonwealth, 87 Ky. 578, 9 S.W. 822 (1888).
11. Browning v. Commonwealth, note 10 supra; Provident Say. Life Assur.
Soc'y v. Johnson, note 10 supra; Tracy v. Commonwealth, note 10 supra.
12. 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
13. Libel, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3056 (1966).
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tain no definition of the crime?14 Florida also adopts the common
15
law of criminal libel both by statute and by judicial decision.16
This dual adoption of the common law has not been altered or redefined to eliminate the unconstitutionally vague element of "breach
of the peace."
There have been five appellate decisions in Florida defining the
crime of libel.17 The earliest of these decisions presented the basic
definition, which has been reiterated and recited by all subsequent
decisions:"'
[P]rosecution for libel is warranted only when the alleged
libel affects the public, as when it corrupts the public morals,
or incites to violations of the criminal law, or when the necessary or natural effect of the alleged publication is to cause an
injury to a person or persons of such a nature and extent as
to render a breach of the peace imminent or probable.
The Florida definition of the crime clearly goes beyond the acceptable standard as announced by the Supreme Court.
By relying on former Supreme Court holdings that condemned the
vagueness of the crime of breach of the peace, the present decision
requires that the "breach of the peace" element be excluded from a
definition of criminal libel.1 9 Florida, by requiring such element, is
necessarily in conflict with this constitutional standard. Other states,
20
as previously suggested, may also fall within this proscription.
The case eliminates an antiquated concept from our law. The
ancient notion that an individual is likely to use violence and force
because he is insulted by a defamation is no longer a tenable theory.
Procedures, such as civil remedies, are now provided that forego any
necessity for this type of vengeance. The decision also rejects the
14. FLA. STAT. §836.01 (1965) provides: "Any person convicted of the publication of a libel shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by
fine not exceeding one thousand dollars."
15. FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1965) provides: "The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a local nature, with the exception hereinafter
mentioned, down to the fourth day of July, 1776, are declared to be of force in
this State; provided, the said statutes and common law be not inconsistent with
the constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of the legislature of
this state."
16. Annenberg v. Coleman, 121 Fla. 133, 163 So. 405 (1935); Eberhardt v. Barker,
104 Fla. 535, 140 So. 633 (1932); Smith v. McClelland, 99 Fla. 362, 126 So. 292
(1930); State ex rel. Arnold v. Chase, 94 Fla. 1071, 114 So. 856 (1927); Kennerly v.
Hennessy, 68 Fla. 138, 66 So. 729 (1914).
17. Ibid.
18. Kennerly v. Hennessy, 68 Fla. 138, 66 So. 729 (1914).
19. Ashton v. Kentucky, 86 Sup. Ct. 1407, 1410 (1966).
20. DouGLAs, note 4 supra; see statutes cited note 5 supra.
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illogical idea that an individual is guilty of libel if the person libeled
might use force against him. This possibility of the use of force has
been the rationale behind criminal libel. Despite the rationale
the courts have not allowed as a defense a showing that the libel has
no probability of producing a breach of the peace.2 1 Using this
standard "makes a man criminal simply because his neighbors have
no self-control and cannot refrain from violence.22
The principal decision leaves the law of criminal libel in serious
doubt in many states. If Florida and other states do not accomplish
a redefinition excluding the prohibited element, any convictions will
necessarily be struck down as unconstitutional. The reformulation
required can be accomplished either by judicial decision or by legislative enactment. If attempted by the judiciary, it will necessarily
have to be accomplished at the trial level in order to avoid an application of the Shuttlesworth principle. The preferable means of
redefinition would be accomplished by legislative enactment eliminating "breach of the peace" as an element of the crime. The elements of the common-law crime left remaining would be: (1) malice,
(2) publication,

(3) defamatory words, and (4) falsity,2 3 which are

essentially the elements of civil libel. This has been attempted in
other states. 24 Until this redefinition occurs, the antiquated concept

of "likely to incite a breach of the peace" as a standard of guilt will
continue to add unnecessary confusion to the law.
WILLIAM

J. SHEPPARD

supra note 4, at 44.

21.
22.

DOUGLAS,

23.

MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW

CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES

151 (1941).

492 (1934). The issues of the constitutionality of

these elements alone without distinction from civil libel or addition of other
elements to distinguish from civil libel are beyond the scope of this comment.
24. DOUGLAS, note 4 supra. E.g., MINN. STAT. §609.765 (1963) provides: "De-

famatory matter is anything which exposes a person or a group, class or association to hatred, contempt, ridicule, degradation or disgrace in society, or injury to
his or its business or occupation."
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